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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
R~J.\.Y-

W. ROSEBRAUGH, as Administrator
of the Estate of Wesley D. Brown, deceased,
Plaintiff and Ap,pellant,
vs.

REX G. BRANCH,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATID!;IENT OF THE CASE
The parties to this appeal will hereafter be designated as they were in the Court below, where Appellant
was plaintiff and Respondent was defendant. As plaintiff sued in a representative capacity as administrator
with the will annexed of the Estate of Wesley D. Brown,
deceased, and as the transaction involved was between
defendant and said Wesley D. Brown, the latter will for
convenience sometimes herein be referred to as the decedent.
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant
to recover an unpaid balance of $2,659.67 assertedly
due upon a promissory note signed by defendant and
payable to decedent. The case was tried before the Court
• sitting without a jury on June 3, 1948, in the District
Court of Weber County, Utah, the Honorable John A.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hendricks,' Judge, presiding. On J-uly 9, 1948, the Court
made and entered its Findings rof E,act and Conclusions
of Law, and thereupon gave judgment in favor of the
defendant.
Thereafter 1 and within the time . allowed by law,
namely, on October 1, 1948, plaintiff filed his notice of
appeal from the adverse judgment, and in due time filed
the statutory undertaking on appeal.

r.rHE .PLEADINGS
Plaintiff's action was based on the following Complaint:

COMPLAINT
''Plaintiff complains of the defendant and
alleges:
1. That on July 30, 1947, Wesley D. Brown
,died, and thereafter .the will of said Wesley D.
Brown was admitted to probate by the District
Court of Weber (Jounty, Utah; and thereafter,
by an order of said court duly given and made,
the plaintiff \vas duly and legally appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of
Wesley D. Bro\vn, deceased; and that on the 16th
day of ()ctober, 1947, he duly qualified as such
administrator, and letters of administration .with
the will annexed of said estate were duly and
legally issued to him; and that he has ever since
been and now is the duly and legally appointed,
qualified and acting administrator with will annexed of the estate of Wesley D. Brown, deceased.
2. That on the 23rd day of .January, 1947, at
()gden, Weber County, ·utah, the defendant for •
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Yalue rPel~iYPd, made, executed and delivered to
the said ,,. . esley ]). Bro,vu, his promissory note
in '"ri tiug:, hearing date on that day, 'vhich promi~sory note reads in 'vords aud figures following,
to-,vit:
$4,100.00

Ogden, Utah
January 23, -1947

In installments after date, for value received,
I promise to pay to the order of

WESLEY D. BROWN, of Ogden, Utah
the principal sum of Four Thousand One Hundred
( $4,100.00) Dollars, "Tithout interest.
It is understood and agreed, however, that
monthly installments of One Hundred Fifty and
no.jlOO ($150.00) Dollars, shall be paid on the
principal of this note, the first of said installments to be paid on the 15th day of February,
1947, and one of said installments to be paid on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter,
until the 'Yhole of the unpaid principal has been
paid.
And in case default be made in the payment
of any of said installments of principal' at the
times and in the manner aforesaid, or within a
grace period of sixty (60) days, the entire unpaid
balance of said principal sum shall, at the option
of the holder of this note, and not otherwise, become due and payable, and notice of the exercise
of such option is hereby expressly waived.
. If this note be collected by an attorney, either
with or without suit, the undersigned agrees to
pay ten percent additional at attorney's fees.
Rex G. Branch

3. That at the time of the appointment of
plaintiff as administrator with 'viii annexed of

s
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said estate, as aforesaid, said note was a part of
the assets of said estate and the property thereof,
and the same came into the hands of your plaintiff as administrator, as aforesaid, as the property of said estate, and plaintiff, as such -administrator, has ever since been and now in the
lawful owner and holder of said promissory note.
4. That defendant has not paid said note, or
any part thereof, except that he paid the insta1lments of $150.00 each due thereon for and in the
months of February, March, April, May, June,
July and August, 1947, when due, in accordance
with the terms of said note; and he failed to pay
the installments which became due on September
15, October 15, and November 15, 1947, and the
said note and said installments .were in default,
and said installment whieh became due on September 15, 1947, was and remained unpaid and
in default for more than sixty (60) days, and
that by the terms of said note, the entire unpaid
balance of the principal sum of said note, to-wit:
$3,050.00 thereupon became and· was, on and prior
to December 3, 1947, due and payable; and that
on said 3rd day of December, 1947, the defendant paid to the plaintiff the sum of $393.9·3,. which
sum and: amount plaintiff has applied upon said
note as follows, to-wit: $3.60 upon the interest
which became due and owing and accrued upon
installments then in default, and the balancP of
$390;22 upon the principal, leaving a balance of
$2,659.67 due and owing and unpaid; and that
the same, together with interest thereon from D~
cemher 3, 1947, at the rate of six (6%) per cent
per annum, is now wholly due and unpaid and
justly owing from defendant to plaintiff as administrator, as aforesaid.
5. That on or about said :December 3, 1947,
defendant notified plaintiff that he would not

'
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· make any further payment upon said note and
\Vould not pay said note or any part or installment thereof, and "·holly repudiated said debt.
6. 'l,hat by the terms of said note the defend-

ant ag·reed to pay ten (10%) per cent additional
as attorney'~ fees in the event the note be collected by an attorney; that it has been and is
necessary for plaintiff to institute this action for
the collection of said note, and plaintiff has employed Arthur Woolley, Esq., an attorney of this
bar, to institute and prosecute this action; that
10% of the unpaid principal amounts to $265.97.
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays judgment
the defendant for the sum of $2,659.67,
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6%
per annum from December 3, 1947, and for $265.97
attorney's fees, and for costs of suit.''
ag~i;nst

Defendant demurred generally thereto, which demurrer was overruled.
Thereafter defendant filed the following Answer:

ANSWER
"COMms NOW the defendant and for
answer to plaintiff's complaint admits, denies
and alleges as follows, to-wit:
1. Admits Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint.
2. Admits Paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint but alleges that the said note was made,
executed and delivered by defendant to the said
Wesley D. Brown by a mutual error of the said
Wesley D. Brown and the defendant in that the
amount of the said note should have been
$1,443.93, instead of t~e sum of $4,100.00, as will
hereinafter be set forth.
6
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3. Defendant admits the allegation of Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint.
4. Defendant admits that the only payments
on the said note made by him were the ones listed
in Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's complaint but denies
that any part of the said note or any of said installments were in default at any time but alleges
that the error of the defendant and the said
Wesley D. Brown had been discovered by both
of said parties and that when the same was discovered, that the said parties attempted to have
the said error corrected and that the attorney
for said Wesley D. Brown and the attorney for
defendant were working on an agreeable settlement of the said note, and that the said parties
were working on the said adjustment at the time
of the death of the said Wesley D. Brown, and
that the defendant paid the said sum of $393.93 to
the attorney for the said Wesley D. Brown. and
notified the said attorney that defendant claimed
the said payment was in full and complete settlement of the said note after adjusting the error
which had been made by the said Wesley D.
Brown and this defendant. Defendant denies that
there is any balance whatsoever due and owing
and unpaid or due or owing or unpaid form him
to the plaintiff and denies that the sum of
$2,659.67 or any sum, together with interest thereon from Dece·mber 3, 1947, at the rate of 6·% per
annum or any interest whatsoever is now wholly
due and unpaid or wholly due or unpaid or due
or unpaid, and denies that there is anything that
is justly owing from defendant to plaintiff as
administrator aforesaid or at all.
5. Defendant admits the allegation of Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's rom plaint but alleges in
connection therewith that he notified the attornev
of t~e said Wesley D. Bro,vn that the said Wesley
6
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D. Bro\vu and defendant had made an error, as
hereinafter ~et forth, and that the said payment
of $393.93 \ras payment in full of. all sums due
from defendant on the said note.
(i. Defendant denie~ that it has been and is

necessary or has been or is necessary for the
plaintiff to institute this action for the collection
of said note, but alleges that the said note has
been paid in full, and denies that there is any
unpaid principal and denies that 10% of the unpaid principal amounts to $265.97 or any sum or
that there is any attorney fee due .from defendant.
7. Defendant denies each and every allegation of plaintiff's complaint except that which
has heretofore been expressly admitted or denied.
And as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's
complaint, defendant alleges:
1. That on the 9th day of December, 1946,
the defendant and the said W. D. Brown entered
into' a written contract wherein and whereby the
said W. D. Brown agreed to sell to the said defendant the business of the said W. D. Brown
known as the Brown Brokerage Company, with
offices in the Kiesel Building at Ogden, Utah, for
the sum of $6,600.00; and it was mutually agreed
by and between the two said parties that the
total purchase price of the said sale and purchase
would be the aYerage income of the said W. D.
Brown from the said Brown Brokerage business
for the previous five years, and that the said
W. D. Brown through an error on his part,
stated that his total income from the said brokerage business for 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946
amounted to the total sum of $33,322.76, or an
average per year of $6,664.55, and that the said
W. D. Brown stated to the defendant that in order

'1
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to make the account even that be \\·ould drop the
$64.55 and call the average for the five years
$6,600.00, and that the defendant, knowing that
the said W. ]). Brown was strictly honest and
reliable, accepted the said figures, and, not knowing that the said W. D. Brown had made an error
in the figures, submitted by the said W. D. Brown,
defendant thereupon signed the said note referred to in plaintiff's complaint in the sum of
$4,100.00. And defendant alleges that the true
and correct figures for the years 1942, 1943, 1944,
1945 and 1946 was the sum of $19,719.63, or an
average yearly income of $3,943.93, which said
sum was intended by both the said W. D·. Brown
and the defendant to be the purchase· price for
the said Brown Brokerage business. And defendant alleges that he paid the sum of $2,500~00 to
the said W. D. Brown, leaving the amount properly due the said W. D. Brown in the sum of
$1,443.93. Defendant further alleges that the
s.aid error of the said W. D. Brown bad been
caused by the said W. D. Brown inadvertently
including a substantial number of receipts from
other sources that were in no way connected with
the Brown Brokerage business, as the books of
account of the said W. D. Brown and the Brown
Brokerage Company business clearly show and
as the other records kept by the said W. D.
Brown also show.
2. And defendant alleges that in addition to
the said $2,500.00 paid by him to the said W. D.
Brown, he has paid on the said account the sum
of $1,443.93, making the total amount paid by
the defendant of $3,943.93, being the amount due
on the said account of the full amount that defendant was to pay for the said business.
3. And defendant alleges that the said note
referred to in plaintiff's complaint ''rould not
8
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ha\·e been signed by him and \vould not haYe been
accepted by the said \V. D. Bro\vn had the two
said parties kno\YU of the error, but that the said
note \\·ould ha Ye been for the correct amount of
$1,443.83 and that the terms of the said note
should no\Y bl) corrected by this court to show
the true and correct intention of the two said
parties and the true aud correct amount of
$1,±±3.93, and that after the correction of the said
note, that the same should be declared by this
court to be fully paid by this defendant and the
same discharged.

\\"'"HEREFORE, the defendant prays that
plaintiff take nothing by virtue of his complaint,
but that the same be dismissed and that judgment be granted for the defendant for all costs
of this action and for such further order and relief as should be just and equitable.''

THE ISSUES
The execution and delivery of the contract of sale,
and the promissory note given in completion of the
contract is admitted. That while the promissory note
was in the principal amount of $4,100.00, only some
fourteen hundred odd dollars were paid thereon, and
defendant repudiated it as to the balance is likewise
admitted.
Defendant's defense to the action lies solely in his
assertion of a mutual mistake of himself and decedent
as to the total price to be paid under the contract. His
theory, as evidenced by his answer, and by his counsel's
statement to the lower Court (Tr. 33), is that the agreement was that the ''business'' was to be sold for a price
representing the average of its previous five years
earnings, namely $3,943.93 ; that decedent, in seeking to
9
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ascertain what this average five year earning figure
was, inadvertently included therein items of income other
than from the brokerage business, and hence inadvertently arrived at the figure of $6,60of.oo, instead of
$3,943.93, and by reason thereof the figure of $6,600f00
was mistakenly used as the contract price, instead of
$3,943.9,3. That as defendant has paid the sum of
$3,-943.93, he has discharge( t iu full his obligations to
decedent and decedent's estate.
It should be borne in mind that no claim of fraud
or misrepresentation is made but only the claim of
mutual mistake of the parties, not of the sc-rivener.
Defendant did no.t seek rescission of the contract, but
the ease apparently was tried upon the theo.ry of the
defendant's seeking a reformation of the note to reflect
the principal thereof as $1,443.9~3, rather than $4,100.00.
The lower court's pretrial order limited the issues
as follows:
"It is therefore ordered that the only matter
to be tried is whether or not there was a mutual
mistake as to the price to be paid for the brokerage business.''
While under some circumstances there may be, in
the case of mutual mistake, the al terna.tive remedies of
rescission or reformation, we need not here concern ourselves with legal principles involved in cases of rescissi<:>'n, because plaintiff neither s-ought such relief, nor
took the fun dam en tal steps of notice of rescission and
restoration of statu quo essential. to seeking relief by
way of rescission. We are left, aceordingly, with the
single question of his right, under the evidence in this
case, to reformation of the note sued upon to Hhow the
principal thereof as $1,443.93, i11stead of $4,100.00.

10
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The decedent ('Yho died on July 30, 1947) for many
years prior to hi8 death 'vas the sole owner of a brokerage business in Ogden, U tab, \Yhich he operated under
the name of Bro,vn Brokerage Company, and which, at
the time of the transaction 've are here concerned with,
had its office at 401 Kiesel Building, Ogden, Utah. The
office 'Yas shared "ith one George Harding Horsley,
"-ho 'vas eng·aged in an independent business. Decedent
and Mr. Horsley had a common seeretary, one Joan
Klissinger (Tr. 5 and 6). Decedent had income other
than that derived from his brokerage business, namely,
salary as manager of Western Gateway Storage Company, a corporation, and various stock investments.
In the late fall of 1946, and primarily because of
failing health, decedent decided to- sell his brokerage
business. Defendant became interested in purchasing
the same, and on December 9, 1946, decedent and defendant entered into the follo,ving contract for the purchase
by the defendant of the brokerage business, together
with the furniture, furnishings and supplies used in
connection therewith, for the total purchase price of
$6,600.00 (Exhibit 9):

"CONTRACT
THIS AGREE1tiENT, made this 9th day of
December, 1946, by and between W .. D. BR.OWN
of Ogden, Weber County, Utah, heremafter called
the First Party, and REX G. BRANCH of Lake
Odessa, Michigan, hereinafter called the Second
Party,
11
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WI T N E S S E T H:
WHEREAS, First Party is the owner of that
certain brokerage business gene1·ally known and
described as BROWN BROKERAGE COMpANY with offices in the Kiesel Building, Ogden,
Utah; and
WHEREAS, Second Party is desirous of
purchasing from First Party the business of the
said Brown Brokerage Company upon the terms
and conditiollS hereinafter set forth,
NOW, -THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
MUTUALLY AGREE.D by and between the
parties hereto as follow-s :
1. Second Party hereby agrees to purchase
from First Party, and First Party hereby agrees
to sell to Second Party for the sum of Six Thousand Six Hundred ($6,600.00) Dollars, First
Party's brokerage business, which operates under the name and style of Brown Brokerage Company, together with the good will thereof, and all
furniture, furnishings and supplies used by First
Party in connection therewith and now located
in the offices of said Company in the Kiesel
Building in Ogden, Utah.
The said purchase price of Six Thousand Six
Hundred ($6,600.00) Dollars is to be paid as
follows: Five Hundred ($500.00) -Dollars upon
the execution of this agreement, and Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars on or before January 15,
1947, and the balance of Four Thousand One
Hundred ($4,100.00) Dollars in monthly installments of not less than One Hundred · Fifty
($150.00) Dollars each, payable on the 15th day
of each month commencing with February 15,
1947. Upon the payment of the said sum of Two
Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars on or prior to Jan-

12
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uary 15. lD-!7, 8eeond Party ,vill be entitled to
take posse~~ion of ~aid business, and thereafter
operate it as his O\\~u, and upon the payment of
~aid sum of T"\vo Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars
8Pcond Party agrees to execute and deliver to
Fir~t Party his promissory note in the principal
sum of Four Thousand One Hundred ($4,100.00)
Dollars representing· the then unpaid balance on
the purchase price of Six Thousru1d Six Hundred
($6,600.00) Dollars, 'vhic.h said note shall, by its
terms, be payable in monthly installments of One
Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars, the first installment . being payable on or before February 15,
1947. No interest "'"ill accrue upon any deferred
payments.
2. As of the date of the payment of said Two
Thousand ( $2,000.00) Dollars, First Party shall
retain for his own benefit-all of the then existing
accounts receivable of said business, and shall
pay and discharge all accounts payable as of
that date.
3. As a further consideration for the purchase of said business by Second Pary, First
Party agrees that during the year 1947 he will
hold himself available to Second Party for consultation and advice with respect to the operation
by said Second Party of said business.

+. In the event of default by the Second Party
in the performance of any of the covenants or
agreement on his part to be performed, and such
default continues for a period of sixty (60) days,
then and in that event First Party may, at his
option declare the entire amount then unpaid to
be due and payable, and may avail himself of any
remedy provided by law for enforcement thereof,
or he may, at his option, declare this executory
Contract of Sale forfeited ·and retake possession

18
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of the said brokerage business, in which event all
payments theretofore made by Second Party to
First Party shall be retained by :E1 irst Party as
liquidated damages for breach by Second Party
of this Contract.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year
first above written.
W. D. BROWN
/s/
FIRST PARTY
REX G. BRANCH
/s/
SECOND PARTY"
Pursuant to the terms of the contract defendant
paid to decedent the cash amounts of $2,500.00 therein
referred to, and on January 23, 1947, gave his promissory note to decedent in the principal amount of
$4,100.00, a.s the balance of the purchase price of
$6,600.00 (Exhibit A.) The note is set out in full in
plaintiff's complaint, Page 3 hereof. Upon delivery
of the note, defendant took over the business in accordance with the terms of the contract, and thereafter paid
upon the principal of the note $1,443.93, and refused to
pay the balance thereof in the principal amount of
$2,656.07. In the meantime dec-edent had died, and
plaintiff appointed administrator with the will annexed
of his estate. Demand was made by plaintiff for payment of the balance in accordance with the terms of the
note, and defendant advised plaintiff he would make no
other or further payments thereon. (See allegations and
admissions in pleadings.)
Thereupon this action was brought. Defendant's
only defense thereto was mutual mistake a.s to the
amount. His contentions in this regard are quite detailed in his Answer, but it is the evidence in support
thereof we are concerned with.

14
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'The "·itlH_~~~ Hor~l«2y, \vho ~bared office ~pace with
deeedeut, te~tified that in the latter part of December,
19-l-t), decedent told him that he had signed a contract
,rith defendant to sell him the business and he (the
decedent) ~aid that they had gone hack and were taking the t~arniug~ of the brokerage company during the
past fiYe year period and then dividing them by five
to get them ou a fi\·e year average, and on that basis
he '"a~ ~elling the businesB to 1Ir. Branch." (Tr. 7 and
8).
H

The "?itnes~ Joan Kruitmoe~ (formerly Klissinger)
testified that around the last of December, 1946,"
(Tr. 13) decedent asked her to take from the books·
(Exhibits 1 and :2) '~some figures" (Tr. 12) for the
years 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946, ''and then get
the yearly average for five years.'' ( Tr. 13) That decedent tald her to take her figures from the ''Bank''
column w.-hich she did (Tr. 14). That she was unable
to take the figures for 1942, but she did for the years
1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946, copied them on Exhibit 3,
averaged them, and gave E,xhibit 3 to decedent. Only
the typewritten figures on Exhibit 3 were hers. (Tr.
14-15). No explana tiou of the pencil figures on Exhibit 3 \Yas offered, but it is obvious they were added
subsequently, to compare the ''Bank'' column figures
with the ''Brokerage'' column figures. Who put them
there or when was uot shown.
H

The \vitness H·. J-. Corkey identified himself as an
accountant who audited decedent's books (Exhibits 1
and 2) for income tax ~purposes, and from which books
he prepared decedent's income tax returns. He gave it
as his judgment that from Exhibits 1 and 2 the gross

15
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earning·s from the brokerage business for the years 1942
through 1946 wa.s $19,719.63, or an average of $3,943.93
per year ( Tr. 29).
The foregoing is, in effect all of the evidence in the
case, and upon which the Findings, Conclusions, and
Judgment in favor of defendant is based.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH
APPELLANT RELIES
1. The lower Court erred in finding as facts the
matters set out in that portion of Paragraph 1 of the
Findings of Fact reading a.s follows:

"* * *, but the eourt finds that the said
amount is not owing, and that there is no interest
owing, and that there is now nothing due and
owing from defendant to the plaintiff as administrator, as set forth in plaintiff's complaint."
2. The lower court erred in finding as facts the
matters set out in Paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact,
and the whole thereof.
3. That the lower court erred in reaching its several
conclusions of law, and each thereof.
4. The lower court erred in granting judgment
against the plaintiff and dismissing his complaint.

THE ARGUMENT
The several assignments of error can, in the interests of brevity, be considered, at least to a large
extent, together, as they all relate to the insufficiency
of the evidence to support the findings, the conclusions
or the judgment.
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'fhLl fundcuneutal quP~tious iHvol\·~d are (1) \vhether
there i~ L...,·uffic'ieut eompeteut evidenee in the record to
e~tablish that the eoutraet prieP of $6,600.00 was in8erted in the eoutract through mutual mistake of the
decedent and defenda11t ~ and ( 2) ''Thether: there is
~ufficie-nt eompeteut P\~idence in the record to show
that the eontraet price the decedent and defendant
mutually intended \Ya8 $3,943.93.
We U8e the phra8e ··sufficient competent evidence''
advisedly, because in a ca8e of this sort "any competent
evidence'' i8 not enoug·h. In this regard we invite the
attention of this court to the rule enuncia ted by it in the
case of. Weight v Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 J>. 899, as
follows:
~'A

comprehensive view of the whole evidence doe8 not establish appellant's claim with
that degree of certainty \vhich, by all the courts
of equity, has always been held essential to
authorize the reformation of a wrj.tten instrument
upon the ground of fraud or mistake. In order
to~ authorize a court to reform a written instrument, the presumptiou that the instrument correctly evidences the agreemeut of the parties,
where reformation is resisted, must be overcome
by proof which is clear and convincing. As is
well said by the author in 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur.
( 3rd Ed.) section 859 :
'Court8 of equity do not grant the high
remedy of reformation upon a probability,
nor ev~n upon a mere preponderance of evidence, but only upon a certainty of the
error.' ''
Also to the case of Uram et al vs Reynolds et al, 55
·utah 384, 186 P. 100, as follo\V8 :
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''Mutual mistakes can be corrected, and
courts will reform a contract so as to express
what the parties actually agreed upon and make
it express the terms upon which the minds of
both parties met. The law on the subject is well
established in this jurisdiction. If the same mistake be made by both parties, the contract may
be rectified, but the proof must be clear and
distinct, as courts do not make contracts for
parties. To secure reformation of a written contract which is presumed to be the real contract
and to contain all the terms agreed upon, the
party seeking relief and demanding reformation
· of the contract must establish the mutual mistake
by evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing, and not merely by a preponderance of
the evidence. Wherritt v. Dennis, 48 Utah 309,
159 Pac. 534; Weight v. Bailey, 45 Utah, 584,
147, Pac. 899; Deseret National Bank v. Dinwoodey et al, 17 Utah, 43, 53 Pac. 215; Ewing v.
Keith,.16 Utah, 312, 52 Pac. 4. The only question
involved in this case is ~Thether the proof produced by appellants, considered in connection
with that offered by respondents, measures up to
the required standard. The answer to this question necessitates a review of the testimony.''
However, before considering the evidence in this
case to the end of ascertaining if it measures up to the
standards there imposed, it is deemed advisable to have
in mind other fundamental principles of law relating to
the reformation of written instruments.
First. The Mistake Must Be Mutual.
This principle is well stated in 45 Am. Jur. at page
617 as follows :
''Indeed, when no question of fraud, bad
faith, or inequitable conduct is involved and the
right to reform an instrument is based solely on
a mistake, it is necessary that the mistake be
mutual, and that both parties understood the
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contract a~ the eon1plaiut or petition alleges it
ought to haYt_) been, and a~ in fact it was except
for the mistake; aud this iH ~o wheth~r the mistakP i~ one of fact or one of law, or one of law
and fact mix~d. Other"·ise stated, a unilateral
mistake is not ordinarily gTound for reformation,
the remedy in the case thereof being rescission.
rrbe court cannot rewrite the contract which the
parties haYe made so a~ to express an agreement
"'"hich they did not enter into.'' ( 45 Am. J ur.
page 617)
Second. What C'onstitutes Mutual Mistake.
'' ...\. mutual mistake is one which is reciprocal
End common to both parties, each alike laboring
under the same misconception in respect to the
terms of the "'Titten instrument. A mutual mistake of their agents is not necessarily a mistake
of the parties.'' (45 Am. Jur., Pg. 618)
Thi~rd. J!istake of Fact.
"'A mistake of fact which is ground for appropriate relief in equity consists in (1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact
past or present and material to the contract; or
(2) belief in the present existence of· a thing material to the contract which does not exist, or in
the past existence of such a thing which has not
existed. The essential element of mistake is a
mental condition, conception, or conviction of the
understanding either in a passive or active state.
When passive, it may consist of unconsciousness,
ignorance, or forgetfulness; and when active,
there must be a belief. The first condition must
al,vays concern a. fact material to the transaction, while in the second the belief may be that
a matter or thing exists at the time which really
does not exist or that it has existed at some past
time, when it did not in fact exist. All particular
errors v.rhich fall under either condition are mistakes of fact and grounds for equitable relief."
(45 Am. Jur., Page 610).
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Fourth. Ignorance.
''Where parties to an agreement are ignorant of facts which, if known, would have caused
a different contract, the remedy is not reformation, but rescission. The difficulty in decreeing reformation in such case is that the minds of
the parties did not meet upon the contract in the
form in which it is sought to be put.'' ( 45 Am.
J ur., Page 611)

Fifth. Real Agreement.
''The high remedy of reformation is never
granted on a probability, or on a mere preponderance of evidence. The strict requirements
relate not only to the mistake and the mutuality
thereof or to the fraud alleged, but also to the
real agreement which is alleged to have been
made." (45 Am. Jur., Pg. 651).
While defendant in his affirmative defense pleaded
many asserted facts relating to the questions involved,
we are here only concerned with the evidence. As the
two principal questions involved are ( 1) that the price
of $6,600.00 was inserted in the contract as a result of
the mutual mistake of decedent and defendant, and (2)
the intended figure was $3,943.93, we view the evidence
in its relationship to those two matters.

I.

THE EVIDENCE IS NO·T SUFFICIENT TO SHOW
THAT THE DECEDENT AND DE:FENDANT MADE
A MUTUAL MISTAKE: IN FIXING THE PRICE AT
$6,600.00 IN THE C.ONTRACT.
Clear and convincing evidence of a mistake on the
part of both decedent and defendant is necessary. What
is the evidence in this regard~
20
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( )uly t\Yo \\·ituesstls testified on this phaSl of the
case. namely, Hor~dey and ICruitmoes. Horsle)·· testified that long after the contract \\'a~ signed, namely, in
late December, 1~)46, deeedent told him that
1

'·they had ~.!:uue baek aud \Vere taking the
earnings of the hrokerage eompany Juring- the
pa~t fiYe-year period and then dividing them by
.~) to get them on a five-~·ear average, and on that
ba~is he \ras ~elliug thl busiues~ to 1\fr. Branch.''
(Tr. 8)
1

Such is the extent of Horsley's testimony as the the
basis of the sale. What is its effect~ Bearing in mind
that the written contract "·as signed some weeks prior
thereto, 'Yhat meaning can intelligently be given to this
asserted statement by dec-edent f
Certainly nothing
more- than that at that time, "'reeks after the contract
was signed, he felt that the contract price of the business
reflected an amount comparable to the average earnings
of the business. for its previous five years. No intimation can be derived therefrom that decedent was selling the business, p.Zus the other ·items covered by the
co·ntract of sale, for such average of earnings. It simply
reflects a then belief on decedent's part that the contract price of $6,600.00 approximated the average earnings of the business. This is a far cry from clear and
convincing proof that decedent, at the time the contract
was signed some weeks before the conversation with
Horsley, intended to sell the business for a price equalling such average earnings, rather than for the price
stipulated in the contract.
The testimony of the other witness, Joan Kruitmoes, was simply to the effect that in late December,
1946, weeks after the contract was signed, decedent asked
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her to take the total of the ''Bank Column'' figures
from his books for the previous five years and average
them. He said nothing to her of any sale of the business
to defendant, or why he wanted them. The most obvious
explanation of why he wanted them, and it, of course is
purely speculative, as any other explanation must be,
was that it was the end of the year and he wanted information as to how his 1946 income compared with
that of previous years. Certainly there was no relevancy between the decedent's asking his bookkeeper for
information as to his total income for the years, and the
matter of price for which the brokerage business, plus
furniture, furnishings, supplies and good will previously
had been sold.
Of particular significance is the fact that no testimony whatever was offered by defendant himself. True
it is that there might have been objection raised to
testimony by him of matters equally within his knowledge and that of decedent, but, as such is an objection
that might have been waived by plaintiff, it is strange
that his testimony was not at least offered. Also, as
we have pointed out, the mistake must have been mutual,
and it is not enough that the decedent alone was in error.
Without defendant's testimony there is a total blank
as to mistake on defendant's part.
What was defendant's position in this regard 1 At
the time the c.ontract was signed was he laboring under
the impression that the $6,600.00 figure represented the
averag·e earnings from the businss ~ Had he himself
examined the books~ Was he relying wholly on what
decedent might have told him~ As to these matters
the record is entirely silent. Defendant alleged in his
Answer that he relied on decedent's statements as
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to earnings. but \\·here is the proof thereofJ! Defendaut's failure to te~tify as to these matters of necessity
is fatal to his elaim, for as the record stands, there is
no proof \vhateYt~r of mistak~ on defendant's part which
is essential to his right of reformation.
We submit, accordingly, that there is not only lacking the clear and convincing eviden.ce of mutual mistake
necessary to invoke a reformation, but there is lacking
any evidence whateYer of mistake.

II.
THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT· TO. S·HOW
WHAT THE REAL AGREEMENT WAS
~\_s

we have previously shown, the burden was on
defendant to sho"-r by clear and convincing proof not
only that the parties mutually made a mistake in the
agreement as written, but also the real agreement as
made.

It is not disputed that the property purchased consisted of the business, ''together with the good will
thereof, and all furniture, furnishings and supplies.''
Defendant's contention is that the agreed price for the
whole thereof \Yas $3,943.93, and the lower court so
found, although there is not a scintilla of evidence to
support such finding. For the court to find that the
agreed contract price for all of the property contracted
for was $3,943.93 is not only to find contrary to the
express stipulations of the contract, but also contrary
to the evidence.
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CONCLUSION
General principles of the law relating to reformation
of instruments govern in this case. Those principles
are (1) there must have been a mistake in inserting the
figure of $6,600.00 in the contract as· the price for the
business, plus the other items sold under the contract;
( 2) the mistake must have been mutual ; ( 3) the intended figure of $3,943.93 must qe established; ( 4)
proof of all of these matters must be clear and convincIng.
Applying these principles to this case, the judgment of the lower court must be reversed.
First. Because there is no clear and convincing
proof, or any proof, that decedent made any mistake.
Second. Because there is no clear and convincing
proof that defendant made any mistake. (No evidence
on this even offered) ;
Third. There is no elear and convincing proof, or
any proof, that the truly intended price of both decedent
and defendant was $3,943.93 as found by the court.
The lower court in granting judgment as it did in
effect made a new contract for the parties, with no
evidence whatever before it that such was the contract
the parties thereto truly intended. In doing· so it wholly
disregarded the written instrument the parties of their
own volition signed, and by speculation based solely
upon controverted assertions in defendant's answer,
with no proof whatever in support thereof, determined
24
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that decedent, \vho i~ d~ad and couldn't testify, and de~
fendant, "·ho "·a~ alive but "·ouldn't testify, intended
other than a~ th~y themselve::; provided in their writte11
instrument.

We submit tha.t the judgment of the lower court
must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR WOOLLEY
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD
Attorneys

fo~r

Appellant
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